Mergers as Auctions by Ivaldi, Marc & Motis, Jrissy
 Mergers as Auctions∗ 
 
Marc IVALDI 
Toulouse School of Economics, France, and CEPR 
ivaldi@cict.fr 
 
Jrissy MOTIS  
Toulouse School of Economics, France 
jrissy.motis@univ-tlse1.fr 
 
April 2007 
 
Abstract 
Most empirical studies that evaluate motives and gains in M&A conclude that acquirers at 
best do not lose from the deal while targets obtain positive gains. With a database containing 
merging firms’ characteristics and final bids, we propose a structural approach to infer 
acquirers’ gains from merging by interpreting a merger as an auction. Using nonparametric 
methods, we estimate bidders’ private values for targets and informational rents. We provide 
evidence of significant and positive merging gains. Moreover, investigating for the source of 
bidders’ private valuation and informational rents, our empirical analysis supports the synergy 
hypothesis as a motive in horizontal mergers. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Every day mergers and acquisitions are arranged bringing together separate companies 
to make larger ones. They may worth billions of dollars and dictate the gains and/or losses of 
the involved companies’ shareholders, managers, competitors and consumers for years to 
come. Paradoxically, most empirical studies investigating for the gains in mergers and 
acquisitions conclude that mergers are unprofitable for acquirers since they lose from the deal 
on average. We conjecture that this puzzling inference might be the result of measurement 
pitfalls of methods that produce them, namely the so-called event studies and operating 
performance studies. Indeed, because these methods rely on reduced form analyses that do not 
take into account the merger mechanism, they may fail to adequately measure, i.e., to well 
identify, the effects from merging. Here, we propose to interpret a merger as an auction in 
order to provide a proper analytical tool for evaluating the gains to merge. 
Interpreting a merger as an auction has two main advantages. First, it allows 
introducing a theoretical mechanism to the merger course in the context of a large group of 
mergers occurring in the market. In other words, the auction approach in mergers proposes a 
mechanism by which the price of targets and the gains of acquirers are revealed in mergers. 
Second, it allows applying a structural econometric approach to the computation of such 
merging gains. In particular, with a database reporting bidders' and targets' characteristics, 
bids proposals as well as the final bid paid for the deal, acquirers’ merging gains can be 
inferred from their estimated private values for targets. That is, bidding gains accrued to the 
acquiring firms can be recovered by means of the informational rents by subtracting the actual 
bid paid for the target to the estimated private valuation of the winning bidder. Furthermore, 
by recovering these informational rents, we are able to investigate for the existence of synergy 
gains in horizontal mergers as defined by Farrell and Shapiro (2001), i.e., mergers-specific 
gains that could have not been reached by other means than merging like internal growth, 
joint ventures or any other bilateral agreement. 
That a merger or an acquisition can be interpreted as an auction has received little 
attention in the literature. There are however some important theoretical contributions. 
Klemperer and Bulow (1996) explain a takeover as an auction and show that targets’ 
managers get higher profits by auctioning the firm than by negotiating with fewer bidders. 
The authors show that an auction with N+1 bidders dominates any negotiation mechanism 
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with N bidders because the rent extraction of an extra bidder is more valuable that any amount 
of bargaining power. Jehiel and Moldovanu (1996 and 2000) propose to interpret mergers 
through an auction model with externalities. According to them, the externality in mergers 
arrives because a merger affects the profits of agents not directly involved in the transaction 
(non-merging rivals). Molnar (2000) applies Jehiel and Moldovanu’s idea and derives the 
takeover premium through an auction setting where each firm is negatively affected if the 
target is acquired by another competitor. In the empirical field, Crooke, Froeb and Tschantz 
(1999) use an auction model to predict merger price effects within structural merger analysis 
when analyzing gains in bidding mergers.1 We share with these studies the general idea that 
mergers could be analyzed as auctions. However, we are not aware of any empirical study that 
estimates the gains of merger takeovers on the basis of a structural model of auctions when 
data about bids is available.2  
In this study, we analyze a merger as the result of an independent private values 
auction and apply the methodology proposed by Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000), to 
estimate bidders’ gains. The procedure consists in estimating the bid probability distribution 
nonparametrically and using it along with the differential equations of the auction model in 
order to recover bidders’ private values and subsequently informational rents left to the 
acquirers. The method has the advantage of being easily implemented since it does not require 
either computing or inversing the Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategies of the auction model.  
For purposes of comparison, we also performed an event study to estimate abnormal 
returns to the merger announcement since such returns have been largely proposed as the 
merging gains in the financial literature. 
Our analysis shows that we cannot reject the assumption that merging is a profitable 
activity for bidders. That is, we find that bidders’ merging gains, measured by means of 
informational rents, are significantly positive. We also provide evidence that private 
valuations of bidders for targets in horizontal mergers are not only determined by the 
composition of assets of the target but also by the complementarity of both firms’ non-
tradable intangibles assets. From our empirical results, we conjecture that, when merging 
gains or losses are estimated by means of informational rents, they are well explained by the 
merger-specific combination of assets, while, when they are estimated by the event study 
                                                 
1 The authors stated that “estimating the bidders’ joint value distributions is just as important for evaluating 
mergers in auction markets as estimating demand is for evaluating mergers in differentiated products industries”. 
See pp.13 in Crooke, P., Froeb, L, and Tschantz, S., (1999): "Mergers among Asymmetric Bidders: A Logit 
Second-Price Auction Model”, Working Paper of Vanderbilt University. 
2 Crooke and al.’s alternative has been applied by Brannman and Froeb (2000) within a forest service timber 
auction. 
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technique, they are mostly explained by external (to the merger) factors. We claim that, 
whereas financial techniques may not be adequate for evaluating the true gains and 
motivations in mergers, our proposed structural approach of auctions is.  
Section 2 provides a review of the most employed empirical techniques that measure 
merging gains and that conclude that bidders do not gain from merging, as well as the 
different proposals to justify such a paradox. In Section 3 we explain why interpreting 
mergers as auctions is a natural step and we describe the auction model for interpreting 
mergers as auctions. Section 4 is devoted to the implementation method of our proposal: Here 
we describe our data and we summarize the empirical results of the merging gains by means 
of informational rents and abnormal returns. Then, Section 5 provides an analytical 
framework for investigating the determinants of private values and informational rents. 
Section 6 enlightens a preliminary test of robustness for our proposal using a bigger sample 
that cannot be compared with the abnormal returns due to lack of data. Finally section 7 
concludes. 
 
 
2. Related literature 
 
2.1.  Empirical studies on mergers and acquisitions’ gains 
Most empirical studies that evaluate the gains of mergers and acquisitions conclude 
that, while targets obtain significantly positive gains, acquirers, at best, do not lose from such 
a deal.3 
A major proportion of these studies employ the so-called event study technique, which 
consists in computing the abnormal returns due to the merger announcement. Based on the 
market model, abnormal returns are computed by subtracting the predicted merging firms’ 
returns, obtained from a period prior to the merger (the estimation window), to the ones 
estimated for a period after the merger announcement (the event window).4 These studies rely 
                                                 
3Exceptions to empirical studies finding non-profitable outcomes from merging are case by case studies based on 
structural approaches on the product market. In such studies structural econometric models are applied to 
evaluate the impact of a particular merger. Data required are composed of detailed information about sales and 
prices of products in the industry where the merger is taken place allowing for a measure of “unilateral merger 
effects” or market power effects via the prediction of price increases. See Pinkse and Slade (2004) and Ivaldi and 
Verboven (2005) among others. 
4 The market model, it i mt itR R eα β= + + , is first calculated for a period prior to the merger announcement called 
the “estimation window”. Here itR  are the actual returns to firm i at time t, mtR  are the actual returns to a market 
portfolio for firm i at time t. Secondly, another period after merger announcement called the “event window” is 
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on the assumption that stock prices reflect the present value of the expected gains created by 
the merging firms, assumption sustained in turn by the efficiency of the stock markets. Their 
objective is to determine whether the announcement of the merger causes the bidder’s and 
target’s stock returns to perform differently. In other words, the abnormal returns are the 
returns that are observed in excess of what they would have been if no merger announcement 
had been made. These studies attempt to investigate the effects of mergers on the merging 
firms, and sometimes on the non-merging firms as well, by testing for the market power and 
efficiency hypotheses. The former hypothesis predicts that a merger of competing (substitute) 
products allows both merging and non-merging firms, to increase prices and profits due to a 
lessening in competition. The latter hypothesis predicts that, if merging parties can 
substantially reduce their marginal costs, they become a tougher competitor so that non-
merging firms result hurt.5 
In this context, event studies affirm that, if merging and non-merging firms register 
positive abnormal returns, an increase in market power is the motive/effect of the merger. On 
the one hand, when the merging (non-merging) firms register positive (negative, respectively) 
abnormal returns, then efficiencies should account for the merger. On the other hand, if 
merging firms obtain negative abnormal returns while outsiders gain, no suitable explanation 
is readily available and event studies evoke managerial hypotheses such “empire-building” or 
“hubris.” Finally, when all players register negative abnormal returns, event studies fall back 
on the theory of preemptive mergers. We return on this point below. 
In one of the most known reviews of these studies, Tichy (2002) concludes that most 
published event studies show that, while targets obtain positive and significant gains, 
acquirers at best break even. Jensen and Ruback (1983) conclude that targets obtain a twenty 
percent excess return in successful mergers and a thirty percent excess return in successful 
tender offers. On the opposite, acquirers obtain no excess return in mergers and four percent 
in tender offers. Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001) reveal that the value-weighted average 
of the two merging firms’ returns is positive, with most of the gains accruing to the target 
company. However, when their sample is clustered by decades, from the 1970s to the 1990s, 
                                                                                                                                                        
selected to compute the abnormal returns. These lasts are obtained by subtracting the predicted returns to the 
actual returns: ( )ˆˆit it i mtAR R Rα β= − + . Thirdly, the presumed merging gains are obtained by summing up the 
abnormal returns over the length of the event window, T, and are called the cumulative abnormal returns: 
i itt
CAR R=∑ . Finally their significance is tested by a t-statistic, constructed as: ˆ( ) /i i CARit CAR CAR Tσ= .  
5 When merging firms produce complement products, oligopoly theory predicts a decrease in prices since 
merging firms will increase profits by selling more of their two merging products than by increasing prices of 
one of them and consequently decreasing both goods’ demands. A similar prediction results in the case of 
quantity competition. 
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the acquirer abnormal returns are never positive nor are significant. Bradley, Desai and Kim 
(1988) introduce the auction effect to their analysis of 236 successful tender offers by 
comparing the abnormal returns when there are multiple bidders with those when there is a 
single bidder. They find that, in the former case, targets’ excess returns increase in time while 
in the latter case they do not change. Contrarily, acquires’ return is negative when a single 
bidder arrives and the loss is greater in the case of multiple bidders. These lasts results are 
consistent with the predictions of auction theory, namely, the higher the number of bidders 
that participate in the auction, the more aggressively bidders bid and the higher the rents for 
the auctioneer (the target). Concerning the event studies that analyze the competitive effects 
of mergers, Eckbo (1985) finds an excess return of almost 20 percent for target firms, 1.26 
percent for non-merging firms, and 1.64 percent for bidders. For a shorter event window, all 
excess returns decreased. While targets’ and rivals abnormal returns are significant at the one 
percent level, acquirers’ abnormal returns are only slightly significant. As it can be noticed 
from this review, event studies converge to the result, that targets gain and bidders do not.  
However, we believe important pitfalls decrease the reliability of this technique to 
analyze merging gains. On one side, a strong assumption is needed to affirm that merging 
gains arrive by this mean, namely that economic profits of the merging (and non-merging) 
firms are perfectly reflected in the firms’ stock prices. That is, the whole procedure is based 
on the assumption that financial markets are efficient and that insiders and outsiders (with 
respect to the merger process) have symmetric information. Nevertheless, variations in stock 
prices may be caused by a broad list of events that could have simultaneously happened in the 
stock market which could turn difficult to isolate the merger effect. Moreover, it might be that 
the gains of mergers are not necessarily immediately reflected in the change of stock prices 
because stock market reactors may not have the same information, or the same long-run 
perspective than the merging firms do when joining their sets of assets. Insiders might have 
better information to anticipate when/how their particular bundle of assets, operated 
separately, can be combined in new ways to generate additional value. Consequently, 
outsiders could underestimate synergy gains simply because they do not observe the assets 
composition of the merging firms and therefore cannot observe their potential combination 
and exploitation. In other words, as market reactors may not have access to the same 
information to estimate the true gains of the game as insiders do; outsiders’ computations 
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may differ from those of insiders’. This might be the reason why financial empirical studies 
incorrectly conclude that acquirers do not gain from merging.6 
Another worry -not very often evoked in the event study literature- is the large 
variation (among studies) of the length of the estimation and event windows. That is, there is 
no consensus in the number of days one should consider the market requires to reveal 
information that translates into gains for the merging firms. Estimation windows are chosen 
somewhat arbitrarily and they vary from [-250, -30] to [-1, 0], where 0 is the announcement 
date. Short periods before the announcement are said to miss relevant information and larger 
periods are said to be too noisy to isolate the merger announcement effect.7 The latter issue 
arrives because stock returns are correlated with other pre-merger trading operations causing 
two important problems to abnormal returns, a higher variance and a lack of identification of 
the source of such returns. Indeed, some research has already pointed out these problems. For 
instance, Aktas, Bodt and Roll (2004) show that ignoring firm-specific events inflates the 
variance of abnormal returns biasing downwards their significance test.8 Schwert (1996) 
proposes to separate the pre and post bid-announcement abnormal returns in what he called 
the run-up and the mark-up respectively. The author shows that the run-up reflects 
information held by other potential bidders rather than insider trading leakage and it is 
unrelated with the mark-up return. From this result, Schwert affirms that the information from 
capital markets (the run-up) is irrelevant for merging firms. If the author’s interpretation is 
correct, the gains of event studies may even be upward biased since they normally include the 
run-up as part of the merging gain.  
In general, these critics focus on the noise of external factors around the 
announcement of the merger that can affect the abnormal returns. They tackle the event 
induced variance but they do not critic the methodology of the market model itself. Indeed, 
they employ the same technique with some corrections, but still the same idea based on stock 
price variations revealing merger gains.  
In our view, the most important pitfall of the event study technique is that it is not able 
to investigate for the merger mechanism and the sources that generate the merging gains. This 
results in identification difficulties. In other words, since the event study generated gains are 
not based on a structural true model, there is no way to precisely determine the mechanism 
                                                 
6 Recall that financial studies compute precisely reactors’ appreciation of the merger. 
7 Some event studies collect stock prices for even five years after announcement, but they converge in general 
results with short run studies, namely, targets gain while acquirers do not. 
8 Firm-specific events can be the announcement of competing bids and antitrust interventions but also earnings 
and other announcements which are specific to the firm and that have nothing to be with the merger. 
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and sources of such gains. To illustrate this issue, consider a merger that produces strong 
efficiencies that are passed through competitors due to innovation spillovers for example. In 
this case, merging and non-merging firms should gain from the merger and should obtain 
positive abnormal returns (provided these lasts reflect economic profits). An event study 
could wrongly conclude that the market power enhancement due to a merger is found because 
it obtains positive abnormal returns for insiders and outsiders, while the real effect is a cost 
efficiency gain that benefits all players in the market. With this technique even the worst case 
may arrive, namely, that the claimed effect of mergers on stock prices just reflects a spurious 
correlation of prices and market indices.9 Recall, that this is a common statistical problem 
encountered in time series regressions including models of expected returns. That is, with the 
abnormal return approach, we might end up by finding that a significant correlation exists just 
because of a statistical coincidence. For example, if the firms involved in the mergers, i.e., 
bidder, target and outsider, obtained positive abnormal returns because the market index, with 
which the event study was run, performed relatively bad (e.g., because of demand shock), 
could lead to wrongly conclude that the involved firms performed better due to the merger 
enhancement of market power. 
Bearing in mind that stock price studies may be unable to provide evidence of the 
gains of merging and on the source of any merger-related gains; a second method to evaluate 
the gains in mergers, the so-called operating performance study or outcome study, has also 
been largely performed. An operating performance study is based on an accounting approach. 
It analyzes merger performance by measuring and comparing the accounting profits of the 
merging parties before and after their integration with those of a control group. That is, 
changes in profitability of the merging firms are compared to similar measures for the control 
groups. Periods post merger vary from 24 to 60 months. These studies are less homogeneous 
between them because different measures of profitability are adopted, for example: cash 
flows, gross profits, profits net of interest and taxes, profit ratios (on equity, total assets, or on 
sales). Different alternatives are also used to control for external shocks, for instance, they 
compare the merging firms with their base industry or with a group of matching firms (i.e., 
firms similar to the merged ones in industry and size). One of the most accepted outcome 
studies by Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) uses the ratio of annual operating income to total 
end-of-period assets as the measure of profitability for targets and the value of the acquired 
                                                 
9 Fama (1998, pp. 291) affirmed that “all models for expected returns are incomplete descriptions of the 
systematic pattern in average returns” and this is what may lead to spurious indications of abnormal returns in an 
event study. 
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assets to total assets of the branch of the firm that made the acquisition as the performance for 
acquirers. Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992) use pre-tax operating cash flow returns on assets. 
Mueller (1980) makes a collection of studies (from various countries) that use three distinct 
measures of profitability, the rate of profit on equity, the rate of profit on total assets and the 
rate of profit on total sales. While the first and the second group of authors use the firms in the 
industry where the merger took place as the control group, Mueller’s collection of studies 
employs a pair of firms that are similar to the merged ones and the industry average as the 
control group. The variation in the employment of this methodology, i.e., the differences of 
sample compositions with respect to length of time, control groups and measures of 
profitability, seems higher than the variance of general results. Indeed, the findings of these 
studies do not differ very much from those of event studies. In most cases, post-merger profits 
of the acquiring or (joint) merging firms are weaker than the ones of the merging-control 
group. For instance, Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) find that, while targets perform better 
than the control group (except for a sample of tender-offers), acquiring firms’ impact in 
profitability is negative. Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992) find that merging firms’ 
profitability declined after merger. The main conclusion of Mueller’s findings is that acquirers 
report worse returns than the non acquiring firms of the control group in the years after 
acquisition. Roller, Stennek and Verboven (2000) qualify Mueller’s collection of evidence 
from such studies as “mixed” because, whereas for some countries profitability improves on 
average, for some other countries profitability decreases. Moreover, often the changes in 
profitability are small and statistically insignificant.  
These studies are also criticized on the grounds that accounting data are imperfect 
measures of economic profits and can be affected by managerial decisions. Moreover, 
accounting profits only refer to current profits which in turn depend on the precise methods 
that have been used to classify revenues and costs inside the firms. As the event approach, the 
accounting approach limits the analysis to reduced form regressions and it does not perform 
any structural analysis behind the decision to merge. That is, in these methods there is not an 
underlying structural model from which one could identify the parameters of the reduced form 
employed to infer about merging gains. 
 
2.2. Explaining acquirers’ losses 
Fridolfsson and Stennek (2005) propose a rational that they call the preemptive merger 
motive (or defensive merger motive) to explain why unprofitable mergers occur. Their 
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framework is related to the Jehiel and Moldovanu’s (1996) model of auctions of assets 
causing externalities on other potential buyers. In their setting a strong positive externality on 
the outsider’s profit makes its gain larger than the gain of the insiders relative to the status 
quo situation.10 Molnar (2000) uses auction theory to model the pre-emption hypothesis as 
well and shows that merging is a rational strategy even when acquirers lose from merging. He 
states that it can be optimal to overpay for a target firm and decrease bidder’s value if such a 
loss is lower than the one the bidder will incur in if staying an outsider.  
Managerial hypotheses like the hubris hypothesis proposed by Roll (1986), the 
empire-building hypothesis proposed by Shleifer and Vishny (1988), the cash-flow hypothesis 
proposed by Jensen (1986) and the market for the corporate control hypothesis proposed by 
Manne (1965) state that the owners of firms lack the instruments to discipline their managers 
who might have objectives other than profits and firm’s value maximization. For instance, the 
hubris hypothesis states that managers overestimate their abilities or use irrational judgment 
when undertaking firms. In fact, the hubris consequence on acquirers’ value is equivalent to 
the winner’s curse of bidders in common value auctions, namely, bidders overpay for the 
auctioned item. The empire-building hypothesis states that managers have other than value 
maximization motives such as the size of the organization they want to lead. Their goal is to 
grow and the fastest way to do it is by acquiring. The cash flow hypothesis states that 
managers believe in the superior quality of their investments decisions relative to those of 
shareholders and that they invest corporate earnings even when this is not in the interest of the 
latter. Finally, the market for corporate control hypothesis proposes that a market for targets is 
an alternative to use as a disciplinary device to managers. That is, it states that takeovers play 
a substitute instrument in insuring that managers’ actions do not deviate too far from those 
that would maximize shareholders’ value. It asserts that, if a firm (target) is undervalued due 
to inefficient management, any other firm (bidder) can detect this inefficiency and buy the 
target to replace the manager. Thus, as there is competition between bidders to acquire that 
target, the target's share price increases, implying zero gains to the bidder from acquisition.  
The common feature among these four hypotheses is that acquiring firms’ managers 
overpay for the target and, as a result, shareholders lose from merging. The thorny feature is 
that such hypotheses cannot be distinguished from one another by simply regarding at 
                                                 
10 The reason is that the outsiders gain from the increase in the price due to the decrease in competition, without 
having to reduce their own production. 
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abnormal returns because these lasts lack a structural model of merging decision and raise 
therefore an identifications problem.11   
In an attempt for disentangling such identification problem, Mueller and Sirower 
(1998) test for the different financial hypotheses that claim justifying acquirers negative gains 
from merging. The authors use the distribution of the abnormal returns across targets and 
acquirers and their relationship to one another to identify the motive to merge. Consistent 
with the stylized facts, they find evidence of value decreasing mergers. In addition, they find 
support for the hubris, empire building and market for corporate control hypotheses but not 
for the market power or efficiency hypotheses. That is, they find that while targets gain, 
acquirers lose from merging. 
The previous review drive us to conclude that limiting the analysis to financial and/or 
accounting techniques not only raises an identification problem due to the lack of a structural 
model, but also limits the analysis to a misleading exploration of the economic rational behind 
bidders’ decisions to merge and the source of merging gains. Employing a structural 
framework of the rational strategy in such a decision might be useful to understand the 
motives and hence to compute the true gains from merging. We propose then to interpret a 
merger as an auction in order to provide a powerful analytical tool for evaluating the gains 
from merging. We propose to infer the merging gains accrued to the acquirer on the basis of 
the informational rents accrued to the winning bidder of the auction process. Thus, our study 
concentrates on the acquirer gains and not on the distribution of the gains among the acquired 
and acquiring firms. That is, we do not look at the sum of the target and acquirer gains, but 
instead we compute the buyer gains from acquiring the target as the gains of a bidder 
acquiring an auctioned firm.  
 
 
3. Mergers and Auctions 
 
3.1. Motivations 
Applying auction theory to analyze mergers is a natural step because a public bid 
places a target into the game of an auction. It is not rare to read in newspapers that, after the 
announcement of a bid for acquiring a firm, another competitor announces that it bids for the 
                                                 
11 The identification problem is present when more than one merger driver predicts the same effect on merging 
firms’ profits. For example, and as mentioned before, the market power hypothesis and the efficiency hypothesis 
both predict an increase in profits of the merging firms. 
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same target. Indeed, mergers involve the same strategic interaction and asymmetric 
information than auctions do. As in auctions, the strategic interaction in mergers is reflected 
when an acquirer publicly proposes to buy a firm in an open market knowing that other 
potential acquirers could compete in the acquisition game. As in auctions, the information 
structure in mergers is one in which the target (seller) has only incomplete information about 
the buyers’ valuations for the former. In turn, the acquirer (bidder) only knows his own 
private valuation but not the valuation of his competitors. In mergers as in auctions, the 
objective of bidders and sellers is to maximize their gain from merging. Acquirers maximize 
profits by bidding for the particular target that could add the highest value to the new merging 
firm, while targets maximize revenue by incurring in an auction process rather than by 
negotiating the acquisition price. The reason is that the target knows that the competition 
pressure of the auction should push the acquirer to reveal its true valuation while the 
negotiation process facilitates hiding the true valuation.  
The auction aspect of corporate takeovers is even explicitly recognized by regulators. 
For instance, under Delaware law, the predominant corporate law in the US, when a potential 
acquirer proposes a bid for a target, the latter’s board of directors is required to act as would 
“auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the stockholders at sake of the 
company”.12 Under the Williams Act, the federal legislation that regards the rules of 
acquisitions in the US, it is required that a takeover bid remains open for at least 20 business 
days to facilitate the auction process.13 That is, bids in mergers and acquisitions are subject to 
delay and disclosure provisions that facilitate the entry of competitors. While chairman of the 
FTC in 2003, Timothy Muris, pointed out that, “auction theory and empirical research based 
on it probably have made the greatest contribution to merger enforcement.” (See Muris, 
2003.) All this suggests that corporate regulators have a preference for auctions because they 
know that auctions maximize shareholders returns and promote efficiency by shifting 
corporate assets into the hands of those that value them most highly.14 In this perspective, 
                                                 
12 Cramton, P. (1998): “Auctions and Takeovers” in the New Palgrave Dictionary of Law and Economics, pages 
122-125. 
13 The Williams Act was passed in 1968 in order to protect investors from difficulties due to takeovers that 
occurred unannounced. Effectively, in the 1960s, a large number of takeovers occurred unannounced. This 
created difficulties for managers and stockholders who were forced to make crucial decisions with very little 
preparation. This federal act defines the rules in regards to acquisitions and tender offers as follows. The bidders 
must include all details of their tender offer in their filing to the SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission) and 
the target company. Their file must include the terms, cash source, and their plans for the company after 
takeover, etc. This is in fact the Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 14e-1.  
14 This is of course the case under efficient auctions. In turn, efficiency in auctions is attained under certain 
conditions, for instance, under symmetry of bidders. If bidders in the auction are not symmetric the efficiency 
property is lost. However, in this study we do not intend to defend the efficiency property of auctions. We 
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matching theory of auctions with practice of takeover auctions, as mergers and acquisitions, is 
indeed a natural step. 
At this point we consider important to differentiate between two mechanisms of 
takeovers, the ones taking the form of mergers, and the ones starting as tender offers, i.e., 
partial acquisitions. This distinction is important since, while the tender offer is a public -
either friendly or hostile- invitation to targets’ shareholders to sell part of their stock; the 
merger is a twofold negotiation between the winning bidder and the target.15 In mergers, after 
shareholders vote to make a collective decision, the two firms agree going forward as a new 
single company and new stock replaces the separated pre-merging stock. Rather in 
acquisitions, shareholders make independent decisions about their own shares and firms 
remain separately owned and operated. That is, there is no exchange of stock or consolidation 
as a new company in acquisitions but instead a partial purchase of stock. 
A merger should be equivalent to an acquisition when the acquisition bears on more 
than fifty percent of the target’s stock, in order to be sure that the acquisition results in a true 
integration and not only on a diversification of the acquirer’s portfolio. For instance, at the 
FTC and the Antitrust Division of the DOJ, thresholds requiring pre-merger notification are 
stated in terms of the post merger total amount of the voting securities and assets of the target 
held by the acquirer in addition to their size category. In fact, some empirical studies find 
evidence of differences in gains between mergers and acquisitions. For example, Bradley, 
Desai and Kim (1988) find that bidders reach positive abnormal returns in tender offers, but 
not in mergers.  
To further illustrate the difference between mergers and acquisitions, we could 
conjecture that the difference in the information setting of mergers and acquisitions is 
equivalent to the difference in the information setting of private and common values auctions. 
In private values auctions, bidders’ private information includes only their idiosyncratic 
factors, i.e., they know their own valuation but do not have private information about the 
valuations of their opponents. In common values auctions, each bidder’s private information 
includes factors that affect all bidders’ valuations. Bidders have in this case different private 
information about the value of the target and each bidder updates his beliefs when he learns 
his competitors’ bids in addition to his own bid. Thus, in common value auctions, knowledge 
                                                                                                                                                        
merely intend to give an alternative to measure merging gains and we start by analyzing the simplest 
implementable case of auctions, namely the symmetric independent private values auction. Further extensions of 
the auction models like asymmetry of bidders, risk aversion, affiliation (which might break the efficiency 
property) are not yet included in our analysis.  
15 In the empirical literature of procurement auctions, it is even considered that, in some cases, the winning 
bidder has indeed won the right of “negotiation” of the contract rather than the contract itself. 
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of opponents’ bids, say bidder j for all j≠ i, would alter the expectation of the own valuation 
of bidder i, while in private values auctions observing competitors’ bids does not change the 
own valuation of bidder i. In other words, the bid of bidder j is not informative to bidder i in 
private value auctions. 
Mergers could also entail some common factors to all potential bidders. Nonetheless, 
in order to avoid this interpretation problem between mergers and acquisitions, we focus on 
“full” mergers, i.e., deals in which the bidder is buying 100 percent of the target. We believe 
that these horizontal mergers are well approximated by independent private values auction 
mechanisms. Using common or affiliated values auction mechanisms for analyzing 
acquisitions or “partial” mergers is let for further research. Here we conjecture that, in 
horizontal mergers, a bidder has perfect information of its internal composition of assets and 
can accurately compute the expected value added of joining his assets with those of the target 
However, the bidder has only imperfect information about his competitors’ composition of 
assets and therefore about the latter’s potential gains of merging. 
Thus, in our analytical framework, the object that is auctioned is the target. For the 
target to represent an auctioned object it must be that it is indivisible. In mergers, a firm is 
actually indivisible since the acquirer is bidding for the entire bundle of assets the target is 
composed of. In an auction, the process starts when the auctioneer dictates it. In a takeover, 
the auction starts when the first bidder has arrived. That is, in a takeover, the starting time 
depends on the first potential bidder. Once the bidder has made public his interest to acquire 
the target, other bidders come along and participate in the auction. Neither in auctions nor in 
takeovers there is a rule that limits the number of bids an acquirer can propose for a target. 
Here we assume that horizontal mergers follow a first-price sealed-bid auction rule. 
Given that, on the stock market, bid proposals are made publicly, it might be argued that, in 
practice, a merger is closer in mechanism to an ascending first-price auction than to a sealed-
bid first-price auction. Nevertheless, we consider that assuming the first-price sealed-bid rule 
for mergers is not very thorny because, in equilibrium, the winner pays the expected second 
highest valuation for the target, say [ ]2vE , while, in a first-price ascending auction, the 
winning bidder pays the second highest valuation, that is, 2v . This difference should not 
substantially change the expected pattern of the estimated gains (informational rents) in 
mergers. Moreover, since in horizontal mergers the two firms agree going together, it is 
unlikely that the acquirer bids several times to win the target as it would be the case in the 
ascending auction. The revenue equivalence theorem could also be a useful argument to 
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sustain our assumption since it proves that any auction format would lead the same expected 
revenue to the auctioneer and the same expected profit to the winning bidder under conditions 
of symmetry, risk neutrality and independency of private valuations of bidders. However, we 
do not test here for the equivalence revenue theorem in merger auctions; we instead focus on 
the computation of merging gains and the first-price sealed-bid auction mechanism simplifies 
our purposes.16 
 
3.2. Modelling a merger as a private-values auction 
We assume that bidders are symmetric and that available data consist on winning bids 
from independent auctions of identical and indivisible targets. Symmetry of bidders in this 
context means that the characteristics of bidders are drawn by nature from the same 
probability distribution which is common knowledge to all bidders. This in turn means that 
each bidder believes that all the other acquirers’ values are equally likely. That is, each bidder 
is assumed to know his own valuation as well as the number of participants in the auction, but 
he does not have private information about the valuation of his opponents. Note that this last 
assumption fits well horizontal mergers searching for synergies (merger-specific gains) 
because a bidder has perfect information of its internal composition of assets and can 
accurately compute the expected value added by joining his assets with those of the target. 
But bidders have only imperfect information about their competitors’ composition of assets 
and therefore about their potential gains from the combination of their assets with the target.  
In addition, we assume that there is no reservation price in our takeover auctions; so 
that the number of potential bidders is equal to the number of actual bidders. Introducing a 
random reserve price in the analysis would imply that the unobserved number of bidders is an 
additional parameter to be estimated. We do not consider this question here because we 
perfectly observe the number of bidders. Moreover, relaxing this assumption would not 
significantly change our analysis because excluding a reserve price in our takeover auctions 
would imply an underestimation of bidders’ informational rents.17 The reason is that such a 
reservation price would introduce an extra random element that increases private valuations 
and hence informational rents. (See Appendix A.1. for an illustration of this issue.) Then, if 
even when excluding the random reservation price, we obtain positive and significant gains 
                                                 
16 As we will see, for the first-price sealed-bid auction we only require data on winning bids to estimate private 
valuations. Whereas with the first-price ascending auction, and the same data it would be impossible to recover 
private valuations, only their underlying distribution could be recovered by employing order statistics.   
17 Our main concern is to investigate for significant informational rents for bidders when merging. 
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from merging, we would only reinforce our findings by introducing it. We base our assertion 
on Elakime, Laffont, Loisel and Vuong (2004) who show that introducing a random reserve 
price is not optimal for the seller who may lose some profit compared to an announced 
optimal reserve price.18 
Formally, in a merger viewed as an independent private-values auction, a target is in 
sale to N  symmetric bidders.19 Following conventional notation, we denote bidder i ’s 
private value for the target as iv . Assuming that there is independence across auctions and 
that bidders are risk neutral, bidder i’s utility for acquiring the target is expressed as his own 
valuation for the target i.e., ( ) ii vvU = .20 In the private values auction, each bidder knows 
his/her own valuation and has beliefs about his competitors valuations’ up to their distribution 
which is denoted by ( )⋅F .21 Then, private valuations are independent and identically 
distributed draws from the common distribution ( )⋅F  with positive density ( )⋅f . The 
distribution ( )⋅F  in turn, is assumed to be absolutely continuous with support ,v v R+⎡ ⎤ ⊂⎣ ⎦ , 
where v  is the lowest private value of all bidders and v  is the highest one. Because ( )iU v  
and ( )⋅F  determine the structure of the independent private values auction model, they define 
the structural elements of our mergers. In the first-price sealed-bid auction, bidders submit 
bids simultaneously, and the commodity is awarded to the highest bid at a price equal to 
his/her bid, ib .
22 Then, bidder i’s expected gain, iπ , conditional on his/her own signal and on 
his/her bid being the highest competing bid, is expressed as: 
 
 ( ) ( ) Pr , ,i i i i jE v b b b j iπ ⎡ ⎤= − ≥ ≠⎣ ⎦  (1) 
 
                                                 
18 It is worth noting that a natural candidate for a nonbinding reserve price is the pre-merger stand alone market 
value of the target since, and as it is exposed in Table 1 of Section 4.4, in our merger-auctions, winning bidders 
always bid a higher amount than the market value of the target. 
19 Symmetry implies that the distribution of private valuations is exchangeable in its arguments. In turn, a 
sequence of identically distributed random variables is exchangeable if the common distribution function does 
not depend on the order of the random variables. 
20 Assuming risk neutrality of bidders is not problematic in our merger cases because adding bidders’ risk 
aversion would result in the ascending auction being dominated by the sealed-bid auction which is already our 
proposal to estimate informational rents in mergers. 
21 Indeed, bidder i faces three major uncertainties, the characteristics of the target, the characteristics of other 
bidders and the strategies of other bidders. In the simplest auction model we focused on the third uncertainty.  
22 Here, the bid ib  is the normalized bidder’s signal, say, ix , then ( )i i ix b b= . 
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where ( )ii bv −  is the gain or the informational rent accrued to the bidder, and 
( )ijbb ji ≠≥ ,Pr  is his probability of winning the auction. Given his/her beliefs about 
competitors’ valuations, ( )⋅F , and their strategies, jb  for j i≠ , bidder i maximizes his/her 
expected gain with respect to his/her own bid and bids independently of the private values of 
his/her competitors. Thus, in the Bayesian Nash equilibrium the bid is only in function of its 
own private value, that is, ( )i i ib s v= , where ( )i is v  is the equilibrium strategy. The symmetry 
property allows to express the inverse function of the equilibrium strategy as identical for all 
bidders ( )1 1( )is s− −⋅ = ⋅  and the probability of ib  being the maximum bid, ( )ijbb ji ≠≥ ,Pr , as  
( )iN vF 1− . Then, the expected gain of the bidder i from acquiring the target can be expressed 
as: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1 .Ni i i iE v b F s bπ − −= −  (2) 
 
Requiring that ( )i ib s v=  solves the first order condition for ( )⋅s ; the symmetric Bayesian 
Nash Equilibrium strategy gives the following differential equation for 2≥N : 
 
 ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )1 1 ,'ii i i i
f v
v b N
F v s v
= − −  (3) 
 
where ( )⋅'s  is the derivative of  the equilibrium strategy, ( )⋅s , which is subject to the boundary 
condition of  ( ) vs =v . Solving for ( )⋅s  one obtains  
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )
1
1
1 .i
v N
i i i N v
i
b s v v F z dz
F v
−
−= ≡ − ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ∫  (4) 
 
The private valuation of the winning bidder i for the target can be recovered from Equation 
(4) and so the gains from merging. That is, the gains of the winning bidder in mergers are 
interpreted as the difference between his/her private value for the target, iv ,  and the actual 
price he/she pays to obtain it, ib . In other words, the acquirers’ merging gains are computed 
by means of the informational rents derived from the auction process, namely:  
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 ( ).i i iIR v b= −  (5) 
  
4. Estimating Informational Rents 
 
To estimate informational rents in mergers we employ the Guerre-Perrigne-Vuong 
(GPV) estimator that allows recovering the private valuations, iv , of the winning acquirers 
according to Equation (4). We then infer the merging gains of the auction according to 
Equation (5). Furthermore, we perform a one-sided test of significance in our estimated 
informational rents by computing their variance. 
 
4.1. Data 
Our sample of mergers has been composed by joining two sources of information. The 
first one is the SDC (Securities Data Company) database collected by Thompson that contains 
the winning bids to estimate the auction model. This dataset also contains the characteristics 
of the merging firms that we require to further investigate for the determinants of estimated 
private values and informational rents. These are the balance sheets’ elements of the merging 
firms that include tangible and intangible assets, liabilities and equity among others. This 
dataset also displays information about the merger environment. In particular, we can observe 
if the merger has being challenged by competition authorities, the attitude of the target 
towards the merger; and more interestingly for our purposes, if the bidder has faced more than 
two competitors. 
To estimate the private valuations of acquirers for targets within the model of 
independent private values auction following the rules of a sealed bid first-price auction, we 
have selected a sample that accomplishes the following criteria. All horizontal mergers 
display a non-zero bid, the effective year of the deal (to ensure that the merger has been 
completed), and the presence at least two bidders competing for the target. We have also 
verified that, in our sample, winning bidders have bid only once for the target in order to 
ensure that we are in the first-price sealed-bid auction case.23 Moreover, since we have 
assumed that bidders are symmetric and that available data consist on winning bids from 
independent auctions of identical and indivisible goods, in our sample, all mergers occur in 
the same industry, at the same period and with acquirers having similar size in terms of 
                                                 
23 Recall that in the ascending first-price auction; in contrast, bidders may bid several times. In this case private 
values cannot be recovered but only their distribution (by using order statistics). 
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relative market value to total assets.24 Given that our study also investigates for merger-
specific gains in horizontal mergers, we focus on deals in which the bidder is buying 100 
percent of the target and in which both firms belong to the same industry. By this mean we 
avoid having “virtual mergers” in which an acquisition of 51 percent risks entering into the 
category of preemptive mergers described by Fridolfsson and Stennek (2005). Also, we have 
verified that bidders have acquired only once within the six months after and before the 
merger in question in order to isolate as much as possible this particular merger event.  
The second source of information comes from Datastream and it includes the 
necessary financial data for the event study estimation, namely, stock prices and indices of the 
merging firms prior and after the merger announcement. We preferred to collect the firms’ 
industry indices instead of the general market index in order to further get rid of general non 
merger specific events influencing the merger.  
Matching SDC and DataStream databases was not an easy task because the identified 
codes of the firms listed by SDC were not the same as the ones listed in DataStream, so we 
had to use the exact names of the firms as their identification code. Because of this last issue 
our sample shrinks to 152 horizontal mergers occurring from February 2000 to February 2003 
in the manufacturing industry of the US.  
 
4.2. Econometric specification and estimation 
For the translation of the economic auction model into the econometric model we 
apply the GPV method based on the following. Note that the equilibrium strategy of bidder i 
in Equation (4) is expressed as a function of his/her own private value, the distribution of 
private valuations and the number of bidders, that is, ( ), ,s v F v N⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ . Because we have 
assumed that the reservation price is non-binding (implying that N does not have to be 
estimated), the only unknown structural element of Equation (4) is the latent distribution ( )F ⋅ . 
Then, the identification of iv  reduces to whether this distribution is uniquely determined from 
the observed bids. Since the equilibrium relation that links the observed bid, ib , to the 
underlying private value , iv  over [ ]vv, , is strictly monotonic, the identification problem can 
be solved. It is based on the fact that winning bids are a function of private values, which in 
                                                 
24 Recall that symmetry of bidders in our context means that the characteristics of bidders are drawn by nature 
from the same probability distribution. 
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turn are random and distributed as ( )F ⋅ . This implies that winning bids are also randomly 
distributed by a function denoted herein ( )G ⋅ . Then, in equilibrium, the joint distribution of 
private values is related to the joint distribution of winning bids through ( ) ( )|F v G b s= ⋅⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  
and ( ) ( ) ( )| 'f v g b s s= ⋅ ⋅⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ . Finally, if each private value iv  can be expressed as a function of 
the corresponding winning bid  ib , the distribution of bids ( )G ⋅  and its corresponding density 
function ( )g ⋅ , Equation (4) can be estimated non-parametrically by:25 
 
 ( ) ( )( )
1, ,
1
i
i i i
i
G b
v b G N b
N g b
ϕ= ≡ + −  (6) 
 
where ( )ibG  is the distribution of observed winning bids and ( )ibg  is a kernel density 
estimator of the observed bids. Assuming that the number of bidders, N, is fixed in L 
independent auctions, and denoting nlb  for n=1,…,N, and l=1,…,L, the winning bid of auction 
L, the GPV two-step estimation procedure can be employed as follows. Letting nlv  denote the 
private value of the winner bidder n of auction l, the first step consists in estimating ( )nlG b  
and ( )nlg b  by 
  
 ( ) ( )
1 1
1 1 ,
L N
nl
l n
G b b b
NL = =
= <∑ ∑?  (7) 
 
where ( )G b?  is the empirical distribution  of the observed winning bids; and 
  
 ( )
1 1
1 ,
lNL
nl
l ng g
b bg b K
NLh h= =
⎛ ⎞−= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∑?  (8) 
 
 
                                                 
25 See details in the Appendix A.1 in which we further explain how Equation (4) translates in the estimating 
Equation (6). 
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is the kernel density estimator of observed winning bids. K is a triweight kernel of the form 
( ) ( )( ) ( )32 135 / 32 1 || 1K u u un= − ≤ , and gh  is the bandwidth or the smoothing parameter of 
the kernel. Our optimal bandwidth is the one that minimizes the integrated sum of squared 
errors of the estimated density, ( )g b? , and it is defined as )32/(1)( +−= Rgg NLch  where 
bg ac σ06.1*= , a is the factor of the kernel (which in the triweight case is 2.978) and bσ  is 
the empirical standard deviation of observed winning bids. R is the number of derivatives of 
the density, in our case is R=1. Finally, by substituting (7) and (8) in (6) a sample of pseudo 
private values of (4) is estimated by 
  
 ( )( )
1ˆ .
1
nl
nl nl
nl
G b
v b
N g b
= + −
?
?  (9) 
 
 
Giving that the density estimator is asymptotically biased at the boundaries of the support, the 
following trimming rule must also be applied: 
 
 min max
( )1 if
ˆ 1 ( )
otherwise
nl
bl g nl g
nl nl
G bb b h b b h
v N g b
⎧ + + ≤ ≤ −⎪= −⎨⎪∞⎩
?
?  (10) 
 
where bmin  and bmax  are the minimum and maximum bids, respectively. Once having 
obtained (10), we are able to compute the informational rents by: 
 
 ( )ˆ ˆ .i i iIR v b= −  (11) 
 
4.3. Significance test  
We next perform a significance test of the informational rents by constructing a t-
Student value for each observation. For this, we estimate the standard error of the 
informational rents for each bidder by first calculating their variance, ( )ˆ −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦Var v b , as:26  
                                                 
26 We thank Isabelle Perrigne for providing this formula. 
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 ( )
( )
( ) ( )
2
2
21 2 3
1ˆ( ) .
( 1)i gR R d
G b
Var IR K b db
N g bL + + +
⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦= − ∫
?
?  (12) 
 
 
Then, the standard error of each ˆiIR  is obtained by taking the square root of ˆ( )iVar IR  which 
is in turn computed by replacing ( )G b?  and ( )g b?  with their respective values in the 
corresponding observations of the winning bids. 
The one-sided significance test for each acquirer is then obtained by forming the ratio 
of each estimated informational rent to its standard error. That is, if the square root of 
ˆ( )iVar IR  is ˆ( )i iIRSE Var IR=? ,  the Student value of each ˆiIR  is 
  
 ˆˆ .i iIR i IRt IR SE=  (13) 
 
4.4. Estimation results 
We estimate the auction model with three different measures of bid. The reason is that, 
to further explore for the determinants of estimated private values and informational rents, we 
consider pertinent to have measures that have a natural interpretation and that can be 
comparable with the event study. The first and most natural measure for the auction model is 
of course the actual bid proposed for the target, denoted herein by ib . A second measure is 
obtained by dividing ib  by the number of outstanding shares of the target, we call it the bid 
per share and denote ibps . The purpose of using this second measure is to obtain 
informational rents per share that are comparable to the abnormal returns obtained from the 
event study (since they are both gains per share). Finally, we also use the natural logarithm of 
bids because their distribution tends to be highly skewed in the case of horizontal mergers. 
Once transformed in logs we observe that the distribution is close to the shape of a normal 
distribution. Another reason to consider the log transformation of bids is that this measure 
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provides higher goodness of fit for the models that are used to investigate the determinants of 
estimated private valuations and informational rents.27  
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of our estimated private values iˆv  ( ˆ ivps  for the 
per share case). Note that the variance of the estimated private values is very large. This might 
be due to the real heterogeneity of targets in these horizontal mergers. Table 1 also exposes 
the actual winning bid ib , the bid per share, ibps  as well as the market value of the target one 
day prior to the merger announcement, denoted by 1tTMV
− , and the stock price of the target 
one day prior to the merger announcement, 1tTp
− . Note that the winner has always proposed a 
bid higher than the actual market value of the target at the time of announcement and this is 
consistent with our guess that 1tTMV
−  is a natural nonbinding reserve price. This is also the 
case when comparing the bid per share, ibps , with the corresponding share price of the target 
one day prior to announcement, 1tTp
− .  This is in addition consistent with the fact that, for a 
statutory merger to be approved, at least a certain fraction must vote for accepting the offer if 
the proposed bid, ib , is higher than the stand alone present value of the target, 
1t
TMV
− .  
 
TABLE 1  
SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
 Mean St. dev. Min Max 
Targets’ market values  
 
1−t
TMV
 
145.804 174.429 2.144 863.737 
Wining bids  ib  212.399 227.177 2.200 890.400 
Estimated private valuations  iˆv  216.397 229.054 5.501 905.492 
Targets’ share prices  1−
T
tp  11.086 8.740 0.290 40.580 
Wining bids per share  ibps  15.923 13.433 0.077 59.705 
Est. private valuations per 
share  
ˆ ivps  16.151 13.577 0.185 61.324 
i. Number of observations for estimated private valuations (per share)  is 146 (143). 
ii. Units are in millions of dollars. 
                                                 
27 Depending on the measure of informational rents, the sample must be adjusted due to the trimming rule of the 
kernel estimator. The final sample of pseudo true private values decreased from 152 to 146 in the case of actual 
bids and to 143 in the case of bids per share, signifying that 6 (and 9 respectively) estimated private values are 
removed from the tails of their distribution.  
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 Using bidders’ estimated private valuations, iˆv  and ˆ ivps  we compute the 
informational rents and proportional informational rents accrue to the acquirer from the 
auction game. These are denoted by ˆiIR  and ˆ iIRp  where, ( )ˆ ˆi i iIR v b= −  and 
( )ˆ ˆ ˆi i i iIRp v b v= −  respectively.  Similarly, we denote  iˆir   the informational rents per share 
and ˆ iirp  the proportional informational rents per share, that is, ( )ˆ ˆi i iir vps bps= −  and 
( )ˆ ˆ ˆi i i iirp vps bps vps= − . Finally estimated informational rents in logs are denoted by ˆln iIR . 
For the purpose of comparing the auction gains and the financial returns, we also 
perform an event study with the data obtained from Datastream. In order to avoid discussions 
about the size of the event windows that event studies awake, we have chosen the windows’ 
size proposed by Johnson (1998), namely 30 days for the estimation window and ten days for 
the event window (seven days prior and two days after announcement).28 Table 2 below 
displays the merging gains computed by means of the auction model, i.e., the informational 
rents, ˆiIR , ˆ iIRp , iˆir , ˆ iirp  and ˆln iIR , as well as the merging gains computed with the event 
study methodology. These lasts are denoted by CAAR  for cumulative average abnormal 
returns accrue to acquirers. They are the average of the cumulative abnormal returns ( iCAR ) 
over the sample of the N bidders, that is: 
N T N
i it
i t i
CAAR CAR AR= =∑ ∑∑ , where T  is the length 
of the event window. 
On one side, our results, gathered in Table 2, show that the gains to bidders as 
indicated by the informational rents, estimated with the auction model, are positive and 
significantly greater than zero according to our constructed one-sided test ( ˆ 0iIR > ). The last 
column of Table 2 exposes the percentage of the sample that shows significantly positive 
informational rents, i.e., the proportions of observation for which the one-sided test has 
concluded to positively significant informational rents. As it can be noticed, informational 
rents are always significantly positive when they are computed with the measures based on 
actual bids and on bids per share. When they are computed with the log of bids, they are 
significantly positive in eighty percent of the cases, that is, in 116 out of the 146 cases. Note 
                                                 
28 Johnson proposes a graphical analysis to determine the sizes of the event and estimation windows (as well as 
the number of securities in the benchmark portfolio) that maximize the leakage of the merger announcement and 
minimizes the external (to the event announcement) shocks’ noise. 
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that, on the other side, cumulative abnormal returns are negative in average and significant 
only in two of the 146 cases. This last result is consistent with the stylized findings in this 
kind of literature.  
 
TABLE 2 
INFORMATIONAL RENTS AND CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS ON MERGERS 
  N Mean Min Max St.Err %IR>0a 
Informational rents (log) ˆln iIR  146 0.021 0.011 0.032 0.003 80 
Informational rentsb ˆiIR  146 3.712 3.053 11.014 0.021 100 
Informational rents per shareb iˆir  143 0.228 0.101 1.619 0.083 100 
Prop. Informational rents ˆ iIRp  146 0.060 0.009 0.600 0.087 N/A 
Prop. Informational rents/share ˆ iirp  143 0.037 0.008 0.587 0.065 N/A 
Cumulative abnormal returns CAAR  146 -0.003 -0.129 0.088 0.020 2 
a %IR>0 is the percent of the total observations that show significant informational rents or abnormal returns.  
b Units are in millions of dollars. 
 
 
In Table 2 we can see that according to estimated proportional informational rents, on 
average, bidders gain a 6 percent of their valuation for the target when it is estimated with the 
actual bid of the deal and nearly 4 percent when it is estimated with the bid per share. We can 
also see in this table that the loss revealed by the CAAR is around 0.3 percent. From these 
findings, we conjecture that the gains revealed by means of informational rents are not 
revealed by the stock market because they reside on bidder’s private information. In other 
words, we conjecture that merging gains are not revealed by the stock market - and so by the 
event study - because they are derived from the bidder’s private information about the target 
firm. 29  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29 Even when we have chosen the size of the windows proposed by Kenneth Johnson (1998) we have computed 
abnormal returns for different windows. However results did not qualitatively change. For instance the most 
common event windows such as 1± , 5±  and 21± showed all negative abnormal returns. 
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5. Explaining Informational Rents  
 
With purposes of testing for the robustness of informational rents in horizontal 
mergers, we further explore for their possible sources. For this, we assume that the bidder’s 
valuation for the target is a function of the internal bundle of assets of the latter, i.e., the book 
value. In fact, the book value of a firm is considered as the ultimate value of securities in 
liquidation. That is, it shows how much the company would have left over in assets if it were 
out of business (as it is the case in mergers). Given that in horizontal mergers, the target is 
indeed selling its complete set of assets to the bidder, we expect private valuations to be 
determined by the book value of the firm. We then decompose the book value of the target 
into its formal definition, that is, into tangible assets, intangible assets, and debt as reported in 
their balance sheets.  We denote these assets by the variables TT , TT  and TD  respectively.  
Tangible assets include cash flows and property plant and equipment whereas 
intangible assets include the remaining value of the firm that cannot be easily traded or 
contracted. Among others, know-how, patents, brand names and reputation are grouped into 
the intangible assets. Here, we conjecture that if the motive of the bidder is to joint its assets 
with those of the target to create synergies, we should have an effect on private valuations and 
informational rents from the combination of both firms’ assets. To take this combination into 
account we construct interaction terms of the target assets with their respective counterpart of 
the acquirer, that is, we create interaction variables of bidder’s and target’s tangible and 
intangible assets as well as for debt. We denote these terms ,T iiT , 
,T i
iI  and 
,T i
iD  respectively 
where T  represents the acquired firm and i the winning bidder.  
In addition, in our context or mergers as auctions, we expect that factors related with 
the auction-merger environment also affect bidders’ private valuations for targets and 
informational rents. Such factors are for instance, the existence of more than two competitors 
per auction, the intervention of competition authorities to challenge the merger and the 
attitude of the bidder towards the auction merger (hostile or friendly). Indeed, since bids are 
increasing in competition in the independent private values auctions model we expect to have 
a negative effect on informational rents due to higher competition. The reason is that bidders 
anticipate that the higher the number of competitors the lower the probability of winning the 
auction unless they bid more aggressively.  
The intervention of competition authorities challenging the merger may have two 
opposite effects on private valuations and informational rents. On the one side, the probability 
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of blocking the merger may reduce the private value for the target (and so informational 
rents), but on the other side it may well confirm that the merger is profitable due to the 
possible enhancement of market power. Since we cannot directly control for such a possibility 
in our sample (essentially because we do not observe the product market), we conjecture that 
a positive effect of authorities challenging the merger may indirectly indicate that bidders 
expect to obtain net gains at the outcome of the merger process. 
Finally, a hostile attitude of the target towards the mergers may of course decrease the 
expected gains of the acquirer from joining its assets with a non participative partner. 
Then, we introduced a set of three dummy variables denoted by COM if more than 
two bidders compete for the target, CHA if competition authorities challenge the merger and 
ATT if the target had a hostile (instead of friendly) attitude towards the merger.  
Summarizing the previous statement, we conjecture that bidders’ private valuations for 
targets can be expressed in function of the latter’s assets, the expected complementarity of 
both firm’s assets and the auction-merger environment that includes more competition in the 
auction, challenge of competition authorities and hostile attitude of the target. Thus, we 
express private valuations as:30  
 
 ( ), , ,ˆ , , , , , , , ,T T T T i T i T ii i i iv f T I D T I D CHA COM ATT=  (14) 
 
Estimation results for a linear version of Equation (14) estimated with GLS are 
exposed in Table 3.31 The first column of this table indicates that the private value the 
acquirer estimates for its target, when this is obtained from the actual bid, is positively 
determined by the target’s tangible and intangible assets TT , and TI as well as by the 
complementarity of intangibles assets, ,T iiI . In turn, it is negatively determined by the 
combination of both firms’ tangible assets, ,T iiT . These results suggest that tangible assets, 
like property plant and equipment, are substitutes for the acquirer while, intangibles assets 
like know-how, patents, and reputation are complements in generating additional value to the 
new merged entity. Note that the negative coefficient of the competition variable, COM, in 
the first column reveals that the bidder’s private valuation decreases as the number of 
                                                 
30 Even when a specification test has been performed, favouring the model specification of expression (14) we 
have also estimated a semi-log transformation of iˆv  with purposes of easiness of interpretation of coefficients 
and of relaxing linearity assumption.  
31 OLS with transformed variables to correct for heteroscedasticity to satisfy the OLS assumptions.  
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competitors increases. This is a result consistent with the auction model. The presence of 
competition authorities challenging the merger has a positive but not significant effect over 
the private valuations. A non surprising result is that taking a hostile attitude towards the 
merger decreases the valuation the bidder grants to the target.  
The semi-log version of Equation (14) exposed in the second column of the table 
follows the almost same pattern than the previous expression. It indicates that there is a 
percent increase in the valuation for the target due to additional intangible and tangibles 
assets. In addition, debt plays a positive role in the private valuation in both, its stand alone 
value and its interacted term with the acquirer’s debt. This suggests that merging firms’ debt 
is complementary. However, the interaction term of both firms’ intangible assets is no longer 
significant whereas the substitability of the firms’ tangible assets is indicated by the negative 
and significant coefficient of this variable. Another finding in this expression is that the 
presence of antitrust authorities challenging the merger positively contributes in the valuation 
for the target. As we conjecture, it might be that authorities feared an adverse competition 
effect, by confirming to the acquirer that additional value would be generated from the 
merger. On the other side, whereas competition decreases private valuation in a certain 
percent, the hostile attitude of the target does not have any influence.  
As exposed in column three and four of Table 3, we also run version of Equation (14) 
with the private value per share ˆ ivps  and the target’s stock price one day prior to 
announcement 1
T
tp − , respectively. The reason is that these are comparable measures since they 
are both values per share. The first one reflects the target firm’s valuation to bidders and the 
second one, the target firm’s valuation to the rest of the market. The interesting insight of 
these specifications, as columns three and four show, is that while the internal elements of the 
target and their combination with those of the acquirer explain a 62 percent of the variation of 
the private valuation per share, they only explain a 17 percent of the stock price variation (as 
indicated by the Adjusted R-squares).  
In summary, our estimations lead us to conclude that, when an acquirer is bidding for 
a target in a first-price sealed-bid auction, he/she is basing his/her private valuation on the 
internal assets of the target and on the combination of both firms’ assets. Moreover, while 
tangible assets seem to be substitutes, intangible assets show being complements in the 
generation of private valuations.  
 
 
Mergers as Auctions 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 - 29 - 
TABLE 3 
DETERMINANTS OF BIDDERS’ PRIVATE VALUATIONS 
  
  
 
Private 
valuation 
Private 
valuation in 
logs 
Private 
valuation per 
share 
Share price 
     iˆv  ˆln iv    ˆ ivps  1−Ttp   
1.131*** 0.006*** 0.032*** 0.026*** 
(0.152) (0.001) (0.011) (0.007) Target's tangible assets TiT   
    
1.081*** 0.005*** -0.010 -0.032** 
(0.371) (0.002) (0.036) (0.019) Target's intangible assets 
T
iI  
    
0.020 4.122E-04*** 0.006** 0.007*** 
(0.041) (1.881E-04) (0.004) (0.002) Target's debt TiD  
    
-1.864E-05* -7.552E-08* -3.978E-07 -8.353E-07 
(1.348E-05) (5.915E-08) (3.914E-06) (8.121E-07) 
Interaction of both firms 
tangible assets 
,T i
iT  
    
7.753E-04*** 2.400E-06 3.875E-05* 3.033E-05*** 
(3.202E-04) (1.942E-06) (2.877E-05) (1.381E-05) 
Interaction of both firms 
intangible assets 
,T i
iI  
    
-1.037E-03 3.984E-06*** 5.998E-05 -1.578E-05 
(1.525E-03) (1.337E-06) (1.300E-04) (1.086E-04) 
Interaction of both firms 
debt 
,T i
iD  
    
-2.319*** -3.071*** -3.450*** -0.323 
(1.116) (1.099) (1.458) (3.171) More competition COM 
    
0.268 3.467*** 3.533*** N/A 
(1.241) (1.081) (1.364) N/A 
Competition Authorities 
Challenge CHA 
    
-1.615*** -0.278 -0.550 -5.806** 
(0.211) (0.314) (0.539) (3.388) Attitude, hostile or friendly ATT 
    
273.056*** 4.235*** 17.601*** 13.557*** 
(26.336) (0.300) (6.637) (3.449) Constant   
    
Observations  139 139 139 122 
F-statistis  102.428 774.608 23.980 4.074 
P-value  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared  0.890 0.984 0.650 0.224 
Adjusted R-squared   0.881 0.982 0.623 0.169 
a Standard errors are given in brackets; italic represent the t-statistic. (***), (**) and (*) significant at 1%;, 5% and 
10%, respectively. 
 
 
 
M. Ivaldi and J. Motis 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 - 30 - 
We now turn to the determinants of the informational rents in mergers. In this respect, 
we test for the hypothesis stated by Farrell and Shapiro (2001). That is to say, we test whether 
in horizontal mergers, taking place as independent private value auctions, bidders are 
searching for merger-specific gains that could not be achieved by other means than merging. 
We conjecture then, that informational rents are a function of the combination of both firms’ 
tangible and intangible assets as well as debt, denoted by , , ,, ,T i T i T ii i iT I D , respectively. 
In particular, we expect to find the source of synergy gains in the operation of the 
merging firms’ intangible assets. The reason is that, while tangible assets can be acquired in 
their respective market, intangible assets can be appropriated only by merger and this last 
issue turns their combination into merger-specific. If this statement is correct, we expect that 
the unique combination of both firms’ intangible assets is the key element in generating gains 
in horizontal mergers. As with the private values, we expect the auction-merger environment 
factors to affect merger informational rents.  
To summarize, we conjecture that bidders’ informational rents are determined by the 
complementarity of both firms’ assets and the auction-merger environment factors. Thus, we 
express merger-specific gains by means of the informational rents in mergers as:  
 
 ? ( ), , ,, , , , ,T i T i T ii i i iIR f T I D CHA COM ATT=  (15) 
 
Estimation results for a linear version of Equation (15) estimated with GLS are 
exposed in Table 4. The first column of this table indicates that while the combination of the 
tangible assets, ,T iiT , and debt, 
,T i
iD , decrease informational rents; the complementarity of 
intangibles assets, ,T iiI  strongly participates in the generation of such gains. Moreover, note 
that the coefficient of the combination of the intangible assets largely exceeds the one of 
tangible assets. These findings reveal that, keeping everything else constant, one extra unit of 
acquirers’ tangible assets (or of debt) requires one less unit of targets’ tangibles assets (or of 
debt) for generating gains. As well, extra units of acquirer’s intangible assets require extra 
units of target’s intangible assets to generate gains. To put it differently, in order to obtain 
gains by combining non-contractible intangible assets, firms are ready to lose from a non 
optimal reallocation of physical assets or from a duplication of fixed costs and debt because 
the gains of combining intangibles exceed the loss of combining tangibles. 
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TABLE 4 
DETERMINANTS OF BIDDERS’ INFORMATIONAL RENTS AND ABNORMAL RETURNSA 
  
 
 
Informational 
rents 
Informational 
rents in logs 
Informational 
rents per share 
Abnormal 
returns 
   ?iIR  ?ln iIR  ?iir  CAAR   
-2.608E-07*** -4.745E-08*** -1.515E-08 1.379E-09 
(9.004E-08) (1.562E-08) (4.899E-08) (5.672E-09) 
Interaction of both firms 
tangible assets 
,T i
iT  
    
9.719E-06*** 1.809E-06*** 7.588E-07* -2.934E-08 
(2.883E-06) (4.771E-07) (5.192E-07) (4.297E-08) 
Interaction of both firms 
intangible assets 
,T i
iI  
    
-1.816E-05*** -2.452E-06*** -3.324E-07 6.259E-08 
(6.995E-06) (9.420E-07) (1.541E-06) (1.849E-07) Interaction of both firms debt 
,T i
iD  
    
-0.482 -0.924 0.926 4.620*** 
(1.109) (1.135) (1.298) (1.144) 
Competition Authorities 
Challenge CHA     
-1.042 -0.709 -1.479 -5.725*** 
(1.055) (1.029) (1.560) (1.084) More competition COM 
    
-1.549** -1.339** -0.786 -0.074 
(0.827) (0.767) (0.983) (0.258) 
Attitude,  
   Hostile or friendly ATT     
6.959*** 1.698*** 0.338*** 3.367E-05 
(1.682) (0.246) (0.165) (0.004) Constant   
    
Observations   141 141 136 141 
F-statistics  105.758 359.760 33.559 5.767 
P-value  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared  0.847 0.950 0.646 0.232 
Adjusted R-squared   0.839 0.947 0.626 0.191 
a Standard errors are given in. (***), (**) and (*) significant at 1%;, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
This implies that whereas the duplication of physical assets like property plant and 
equipment decreases the expected gains from merging, the complementarity of assets like 
know-how and reputation increases them. In other words, our results suggest that tangible 
assets are perceived as substitutes while intangible assets are perceived as complements for 
merging firms. Note that this result is robust to the log-linear version of informational rents 
exposed in the second column of Table 4. 
Consistent with the determinants of private valuations, here, a hostile attitude towards 
the merger decreases informational rents. However, the remaining factors of the merger 
environment, namely, competition and antitrust authorities’ intervention do not affect bidders’ 
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private informational rents from merging (these variables by contrast are the only significant 
ones in the abnormal returns regression, exposed in the last column of Table 4.  
Once again, the purpose of running Equation (15) with the informational rents per 
share and with the abnormal returns, exposed in columns three an for of Table 4, is to 
highlight that while the combination of both firms’ assets explain a 62 percent of the variation 
of the informational rents per share, they only explain a 19 percent of the abnormal returns (as 
indicated by the Adjusted R-squares). 
In summary, we find that, when merging gains are estimated by means of 
informational rents, they are well explained by the merger-specific combination of assets, 
while, when they are estimated by the event study technique, they are mostly explained by 
external (to the merger) factors. This suggests that the sources of financial gains (or abnormal 
returns) accrued to acquirers are not based on the fundamentals of the acquired target but 
mostly on the basis of external market shocks. 
 
 
6. Extensions 
 
Our previous estimations are limited to less than 150 observations because we wanted 
to compare our auction gains with the event study gains. We now perform the estimation of 
informational rents with a bigger sample in order to further test for the validity of our 
hypothesis of mergers as auctions. Using a sample of 804 horizontal mergers separated by 
industry we still find that informational rents are positive and significant in average. (See 
Table 5.) 
 
TABLE 5 
INFORMATIONAL RENTS OF HORIZONTAL MERGERS BY INDUSTRY a 
Informational Rents ? ˆ( )= −i i iIR v b  
Industry Obs. Mean St.dev. Student 
Manufacturing 243 0.4769 0.2080 2.29 
Services 183 0.4729 0.2075 2.28 
Finance, Insurance 332 0.4587 0.1841 2.49 
Utilities 46 0.4467 0.1413 3.16 
Total 804 0.4682 0.1992 2.35 
a Units are millions of dollars. 
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These numbers indicate that horizontal mergers generate informational rents. With 
respect to the determinants of the private valuations for targets we find consistency with our 
previous results, that is, the private value the acquirer estimates for its target is positively 
determined by the target’s intangibles, TI  and by the complementarity of the target and 
bidder’s intangible assets, ,T iiI .
32 
A further objective of our analysis is to estimate an affiliated private value auction 
model with asymmetric bidders in horizontal mergers because the assumption of 
independence in competitors’ bids and symmetry of bidders might be considered as 
inappropriate in a market for targets. Indeed, as there is some possibility of a resale market 
after the merger, it is likely that bidders’ private valuations might be correlated or more 
generally affiliated. On the other side, a pure common value auction would also be 
inappropriate in horizontal mergers because it would be hardly the case that every acquirer 
would perceive the same synergy gains when putting his assets working together with those of 
the target. Still a common element may be present in competing bidders’ private valuations 
for a target since they operate in the same market. It would be reasonable to consider that 
there are some interactions among bidders’ valuations in the sense that, if one bidder 
perceives the value of the auctioned firm to be high, it is likely that other bidders also 
perceive this value to be high. Estimating the affiliated private values auction requires a 
conditional kernel with which we are still working on.  
In a first tentative to relax the independence assumption we estimate the true premium 
of the acquirer when winning the target. That is, we try to investigate if the premium the 
acquirer is expecting to obtain, when bidding the highest price for the target is positive by 
estimating the first-price sealed-bid auction model not with the variable bid but instead, with 
the variable premium, defined as: 
 
 ,
T
i
i T
b MVpre
MV
−=  (16) 
 
 
where ib is the winning bid of acquirer i and 
TMV  is the actual market value of the acquired 
target T at the time of the bid. As Table 6 shows the estimated true premium is positive in 
                                                 
32 These results are available from the authors upon request. 
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average but not always significant. This might be because the number of observations has 
decreased from 804 to 401. This is due to two factors; the first one is that we do not always 
observe the market value of the target and the second one is the trimming rule of the kernel 
density estimator. In the case of the premium the tails of the kernel are strongly biased and 
therefore eliminated from the final sample of pseudo true premiums. Still, these numbers 
indicate that in the Finance and Insurance sector for example, bidders obtain a gain of around 
0.06 percent of the value of the target.   
 We also intend to test for the common value auction hypothesis in acquisitions since 
for such test we only require data on bids as well, information that is available in our 
database. The test would be based on two characteristics of the common value auctions. The 
first one is the winner’s course (because it only arises in the common values auction). The 
second one is based on the prediction about the conditional expectation of winning the auction 
in common value auctions which is decreasing in the number of competitors each bidder faces 
(while it is invariant in the private values model). 
 
TABLE 6 
ESTIMATED PREMIUMS OF HORIZONTAL MERGERS BY INDUSTRY A 
Industry Obs. Mean St.dev. Student 
Manufacturing 101 6.640E-04 4.340E-04 1.530 
Services 85 6.060E-04 1.870E-04 3.250 
Finance and Insurance 215 5.700E-04 9.600E-05 5.910 
Total 401 6.160E-04 3.030E-04 2.030 
a Units are millions of dollars. 
 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
This paper proposes to interpret a merger as an auction in order to provide a powerful 
analytical tool for evaluating the gains from merging. It builds up on some dissatisfaction 
with event studies and operating performance studies that estimate the gains of mergers. 
These studies make use of financial and accounting data respectively without specifying any 
structural economic model to infer merging gains and without investigating for the source of 
merging gains. 
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In this study, we hypothesize that horizontal mergers parallel a private value auction 
mechanism. The reasoning is that a bid situates a corporation into the game of an auction. 
Once a tender offer is open, any other potential bidder is free to propose a price for the target; 
and the winner is the bidder with the highest bid. Data containing the winning bids allow us to 
compute the equilibrium bidding strategy of the auction game and therefore to infer about the 
merging gains accrued to the bidder by means of informational rents from the auction. By 
computing the gains of acquirers in mergers within a first-price sealed-bid auction 
mechanism, this study shows that merging is a profitable activity for bidders. In other words, 
our estimations confirm that acquirers gain from merging as they show that the estimated 
informational rents are significantly positive.  
A parallel event study is performed for purposes of comparison. Consistent with 
stylized facts, our event study finds that the cumulative average abnormal returns to acquirers 
are negative and not significant.  
These results lead us claim that we provide evidence of the positive gains accrued to 
acquirers contrary to the general results of financial and accounting empirical studies. 
Moreover, we find that private valuations of bidders for targets in horizontal mergers 
are not only determined by the composition of assets of the target that determine its stand 
alone value, but also by the value-added brought to the new entity by the complementarity of 
both firms’ assets. Concerning the merging gains, we find that, when they are estimated by 
means of informational rents, they are well explained by the merger-specific combination of 
assets.  In particular, we find that while tangible assets are substitutes in generating 
informational rents, intangibles assets are complements. Since intangible assets cannot be 
appropriated by other mean than merging, this result lead us to claim that we find evidence for 
the synergy hypothesis in mergers, namely mergers-specific gains that could not be generated 
otherwise.  
 On the other side, when gains are estimated by the event study technique, they are 
mostly explained by external (to the merger) factors. We conclude from this evidence that, 
whereas financial techniques may not be adequate for evaluating the true gains and 
motivations in mergers, our proposed structural approach of auctions is. 
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Appendix 
 
A.1. Identification of the Auction Model 
In the symmetric Independent Private Values (IPV herein) model, the underlying joint 
distribution of bidders’ valuations ( )F ⋅  is nonparametrically identified even if only one bid is 
observed (the winning one).  
The primitive of interest is given by the equilibrium condition of the symmetric IPV 
model, Equation (4). GPV have shown that this equation leads to a closely related structural 
econometric model. They do so by departing for the assertion that since observed bids are 
functions of unknown private values and the latter are randomly distributed, then the former 
are randomly distributed as well. Denote the private values distribution as ( )F ⋅ ,  the observed 
bids’ distribution by ( )G ⋅ .  Given the assumption of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, ( )G ⋅  
consists indeed on a single mapping from the true distribution of valuations, ( )F ⋅  to a 
distribution of bids. That is, given that equilibrium is attained when each player is acting 
optimally against the distribution of competitors’ behaviour, both, the distribution of 
opponents’ behaviour and the optimal (equilibrium) choice of each bidder are observable. 
This last point is what enables the identification of the latent joint distribution of bidders’ 
valuations. However, given that ( )G ⋅  depends on ( )F ⋅  directly through v and indirectly 
through the equilibrium strategy ( )s ⋅ , which in turn depends on ( )F ⋅ , the identification 
problem is not trivial. To solve for this, it must be that each private value iv  can be expressed 
as a function of the corresponding bid ib , the distribution ( )G ⋅  and its density ( )g ⋅ . The 
authors proposed the to let ( )g ⋅  be the density of observed bids in the differential Equation 
(3), which is, [ ]( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 'i i i i i iv b N f v f v F v s v⎡ ⎤= − − ⎣ ⎦ . The introduction of ( )g ⋅  and 
( )G ⋅  in Equation (3) simplifies its expression by eliminating the first derivative, ( )'s ⋅ , the 
distribution ( )F ⋅  and its density ( )f ⋅ . If ( )G ⋅  is the distribution of observed bids, for 
every [ ] [ ])(,, vsvbbb =∈ , then 
   
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )1 1Pr Pr .G b b b v s b F s b F v− −= ≤ = ≤ = =? ?  (17) 
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This implies that the distribution of observed bids is absolutely continuous with support 
( ),v s v⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ and density ( ) ( )( )vs vfbg '= , where v  is the inverse of the equilibrium strategy, i.e.,    
( )bsv 1−= .  The ratio ( )( ) ( )'
f v
s v F v
 will then be equal to ( )( )
g b
G b
. The differential Equation (3) is 
rearranged to express the latent private value iv  in an estimable equation expressed as: 
 
 ( ) ( )( )
1, , .
1
i
i i i
i
G b
v b G N b
N g b
ϕ= ≡ + −  (18) 
 
 
Note that the bidder’s latent private value in Equation (18) is expressed as a function of his 
equilibrium bid ib , the joint distribution of the competing bids ( )iG b , its density  ( )ig b  and 
the number of bidders N. Because Equation (18) is the inverse of bidder i’s equilibrium bid 
function, it turns to be the mapping needed to infer valuations from bids. Since the joint 
distribution of bids is observable, identification of each private value iv  and therefore of the 
joint distribution ( )F ⋅  follows directly from (18). In other words, if ib  is the equilibrium bid 
of the auction game, then the bidder’s private value, iv , corresponding to ib  must satisfy (18). 
Now ,let us now explain the underestimation problem we are incurring in by ignoring 
a random reservation price. To illustrate this, call 0p  the random reserve price of the target. 
Since in equilibrium, the strategy of the seller is to set the reserve price equal to his private 
value, the distribution of 0p  is the distribution of the target’s private value, call it ( )0F p . If 
this random reserve price is included in the auction, a truncation factor must be introduced 
because a potential bidder with a private value lower than 0p  does not bid. That is, the 
probability for bidder i winning the target must be adjusted to 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0 0 0* * Pr * 1G b s v b v p F v F p F p= ≤ ≥ = − −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  where *b  is the equilibrium 
bid and ( )* *G b  its distribution. When differentiating with respect to the equilibrium bid *b , 
one obtains a conditional density of the form ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )01 ' 1g b s v f v F p= − . As a result, 
the private valuation would be modified upwards by this term as 
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( ) ( )( )
( )
( ) ( )0 0
1 1, ,
1 1
i
i i i
i i
G b F p
v b G N b
N g b F p g b
ϕ ⎛ ⎞= ≡ + +⎜ ⎟− −⎝ ⎠
. Since our interest is to investigate 
for bidders’ gains, which are statistically significant, such underestimation even reinforces our 
hypothesis, namely, acquirers gain from merging. 
 
A.2. Issues about the determinants of the private values estimations 
Concerning the verification of the two key assumptions for obtaining identifiable and 
consistent OLS estimators of specifications (14) and (15) we have performed tests of 
endogeneity and linear relationships among regressors. Endogeneity may be due to three 
reasons: omitted variables, measurement error due to imperfect measures of the latent or of 
the independent variables and simultaneity. We have performed a Ramsey regression 
specification error test (RESET) to investigate if we do have problems of endogeneity due to 
omitted variables and to verify then if regressors are correlated with the error term. We 
performed the Ramsey test in two ways, one using the powers of the fitted values and another 
using the powers if the individual elements of X , where X  is the vector of the right hand 
side variables or specifications (14) and (15). Both RESETs favoured our private values 
specification. That is, even if we were missing some variable in our specification it is still the 
case this acquirers decisions about X  don not depend on unobservable (to us) factors. 
Moreover, we can be sure that we do not have endogeneity problems in this expression due to 
simultaneity. Because neither the fundamentals of the target firm nor the interaction terms of 
such fundamentals with its acquirer’s counterparts depend on the private valuations of 
acquirers for targets. Then, private valuations are unique to the acquirer and there is no 
manner they could influence the target’s fundamentals. With respect to measurement errors 
concerns, the dependent variable iˆv  is by construction measured with a random error since it 
is itself an estimation of the true private value iv . However, the size of the estimation error of 
iˆv , hereinafter denoted by iˆvε , is unlikely to be systematically related to the other variables 
X  and should then not cause problems of measurement errors coming from the dependent 
variable. Concerning the measurement error in the explanatory variables, we are aware that 
the perception of the targets’ intangibles for acquires might be different to the variable 
intangible reported in the balance sheets by the targets themselves, which is indeed what we 
can observe. In that case, it might be that the intangible fundamental is only incompletely 
observed to the analyst implying *T T II I e= +  where *TI is the intangible asset as computed 
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and perceived by acquirers and TI is the observed intangible, so that Ie  is the measurement 
error of this variable.33 We assume that we are facing the classical error in variables property, 
namely that the measurement error is uncorrelated with the unobserved explanatory variable, 
which implies in fact that our observed variable and its measurement error are correlated, as 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* 2 2, I IT T TI I I eCov I e E I e E I e E e σ= = + = . We then assume that the covariance 
between our measure of intangibles and its measurement error is equal to the variance of the 
measurement error. As it is well known, this causes a downwards attenuation bias to our OLS 
estimated coefficient of  TI  (since the coefficient is positive). However, at the end of the day 
we are not deeply concerned for this attenuated bias since even underestimated the coefficient 
it is strongly significant and of considerable dimension which is what matters to prove our 
hypothesis. 
On the other side, we have performed tests of variance inflation factors to detect if our 
regressors show close linear relationships among each other. Our tests show the elements of  
X are not highly collinear. Finally, our tests of heteroskedasticity by means of Lagrange 
multiplier à la Breusch and Pagan indicate that the conditional variance of the error term iε  is 
not constant, i.e. 2( )i iVar ε σ=X . To ensure the asymptotic validity of the OLS standard 
errors and t-statistics we have performed weighted least squares correcting for the 
heteroskedasticity by dividing the dependent and the independent variables by an estimate of 
the conditional standard deviation of the error term on the squares of the explicative variables, 
( ) 1/ 22var i iε⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦x . Indeed; applying OLS to the weighted data largely improved the general 
goodness of fit of our model and the individual t-statistics. 
 
                                                 
33 In Motis, Damien and Seabright (2006) we tried to construct a more accurate measure or the market value of 
intangibles that we called Total Value of Intangibles AVA  by setting A A A A AVA I G V E= + + −  where, AI  are 
the identified intangibles (the ones reported in balance sheets), AG  is the goodwill, AV  is the market value of 
the target and AE  is equity. In this study we have also performed our regressions with this variable finding 
always a positive and significant coefficient for AVA . However we could not get rid of multicolinearity problems 
since AVA  is by construction closely related to AT . 
